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building meets the conditions of authenticity and 
integrity which in turn are necessary requirements 
for it to be included in the World Heritage List.2
Indeed raising the persistence question results in 
revealing what our concept of a building is. In fact, 
by exploring the persistence question about build-
ings, we may discover that, according to our best 
intuitions and judgements, a building can survive 
some kinds of change or transformation and cannot 
survive others. This discloses what properties are 
constitutive of a building, and what properties are 
merely contingent. Further investigating why this 
is so is important for understanding the way we 
think of buildings, as well as for serving our goals 
(e.g. heritage preservation and conservation) in a 
more efficient and consistent way. It may also help 
architects to be more self-conscious of what they 
do when they design and bring into existence new 
buildings, make choices that affect their life cycle, 
or modify some of their features (such as their 
functions).
In this article I focus on one specific kind of 
property change and its effects on the persistence 
of buildings: spatial relocation. If we engage in 
the thought experiment of imagining a situation 
(that might soon become a technically practicable 
option) in which a specific building like Notre Dame 
Cathedral is transferred stone-by-stone from Paris 
to a very different location, we will normally have 
a strong intuition that the relocated cathedral is no 
longer Notre Dame. But why?
Introduction
In this essay I will deal with the persistence ques-
tion about buildings, taken as a central member 
of the category of architectural entities. Generally 
speaking, the persistence question is a question 
about what is necessary and sufficient for a numer-
ical identity among entities existing at different times 
to hold. Raising the persistence question about 
buildings amounts to asking what is necessary and 
sufficient for a past (or future) building to exist now.
Of course this question is fundamental to our 
practices concerning the conservation, restora-
tion and rehabilitation of buildings, which are often 
dedicated to letting a specific individual building 
continue to exist in time. Apart from important issues 
such as who should establish what is historically 
significant, what role heritage conservation should 
have in a society, and whether it stands in the way 
of progress, a more basic question is how we can 
determine whether a building from the past exists 
now (since, contrary to appearance, it might not have 
survived the changes it has undergone) and what 
conditions must hold for a building existing in the 
future to count as this building existing in the future 
(since, contrary to appearances and despite – or 
even because of – our efforts to preserve it, it may 
cease to exist in the meantime).1 In other words, 
heritage conservation is simply impracticable if the 
persistence question about buildings is not raised. 
Again, the persistence question seems an inescap-
able question, also in order for the UNESCO World 
Heritage Committee to verify whether a particular 
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perhaps even non-human beings; it could also 
include the conception of the building in certain 
ways and the attribution to it of certain functions, 
significance, aesthetic value, and so on. It would of 
course be interesting to investigate how, if ever, a 
change in the broad context that is not also part of 
the narrow context affects the persistence question 
about buildings. Just to mention one possibility, it 
seems only reasonable for the social and cultural 
geographers inspired by actor network theory, who 
in the last decades have taken even an object’s 
status as a ‘building’ to be not given but produced 
by social and cultural work of various kinds, to claim 
that if certain relevant social and cultural processes 
fail, the building’s identity is destroyed.4
I find it equally admissible, however, to raise the 
persistence question about buildings with regard 
to the narrow context, provided that we make one 
indispensable assumption. It must be assumed 
(as I do) that when the persistence of a building 
is affected by a context change (such as reloca-
tion) that involves some change both in the narrow 
context and in that part of the broad context that is 
not also part of the narrow context, the change in 
the narrow context alone would have been sufficient 
to produce the same effect.5
The persistence question about buildings
Raising the persistence question about buildings 
consists in asking what is necessary and sufficient 
for a past or future architectural entity, like a building, 
to exist now. As usually happens with regard to 
other items, the persistence question about build-
ings is twisted together with some other questions, 
such as the buildinghood question (what is neces-
sary and sufficient for something to be a building, 
or equivalently, what distinguishes a building from a 
non-building) and the ontological question – what a 
building exactly consists in: a material object rather 
than an event, a type rather than a token, and so 
on.6
I will argue that this happens because buildings 
are constitutively located in a certain place. But 
again, why? And why – unlike buildings – do ordi-
nary objects and the vast majority of works of art 
not turn out to be similarly constitutively character-
ised by a certain location? I will explore different 
answers, rejecting them one by one; and I will finally 
get to what I consider the correct one.
Indeed my answer will have some interesting 
consequences with regard to further issues 
concerning the ontological and aesthetic status 
of architecture. In particular, architectural entities 
like buildings turn out to have much in common 
with a specific class of works of art, namely site-
specific works of art. I will not commit to the thesis 
that architecture is art, either always or only in 
some specific circumstances (and I will signal 
my neutrality by employing here and there in the 
essay the dubitative expression ‘architectural work 
(of art)’). Nevertheless I will conclude that, if archi-
tectural entities like buildings are to be considered 
works of art, they should be considered site-specific 
works of art. The main reason is that site-specific 
works of art, too, cannot survive relocation (at least, 
as we will see, this has been true until an intense 
mobilisation of site-specific works of art has become 
customary in the art world since the late 1980s); 
and, the explanation of their incapacity to survive 
relocation is the same as for buildings.3
A clarification is due regarding the use of the 
expressions ‘context’ and ‘outer context’ that I will 
make in this essay. By using these terms, I will refer 
to the material external environment of a building, 
as constituted by material entities (such as trees, 
rivers, streets, bell towers, other buildings, sunlight) 
and the properties instantiated by them. I am aware 
that the ‘context’ of a building can legitimately be 
thought, in the wider sense, to include social prac-
tices, cultural habits, political institutions, as well 
as the experience of the building by human and 
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is, performances where various materials are held 
together in specific assemblages by everyday 
social practices.8 Many architects aware of this 
kind of literature have explicitly embraced the idea 
of working on complex spatial projects prioritising 
social and economic objectives rather than simply 
creating new material objects.9
No matter whether we consider a building to 
consist in a material object or an event, we may take 
it to consist in a type rather than a token. Here we 
must take into account Nelson Goodman’s distinc-
tion between one-stage and two-stage arts.10 While 
painting and literature are one-stage arts, since the 
resulting work of art can be fully experienced after 
the artist has painted or written it, classical music 
(but not jazz improvisation) is two-stage, since a 
performance must follow the act of composition 
in order for the work of art to be enjoyed. Now, it 
seems that architecture is a two-stage activity (we 
do not need to concede here that architecture is 
art): first a plan is produced and later one or more 
edifices are built following the plan. Although the 
architectural plan is dissimilar from a musical score 
in that it does not count as instructions to produce 
performances that are instances of the work, it is 
still similar to the musical score in that it counts 
as instructions to produce something that is an 
instance of the work – material constructions rather 
than performances.11
In this scenario, a first question is whether the 
architectural work (of art) is to be identified with the 
type expressed by the architectural plan or with 
one of its instances. A second question, however, 
is whether the building (as an architectural entity) 
should be identified with the type or with each of its 
instances. Perhaps the answer to this second ques-
tion depends on the answer to the first – since, for 
example, the building is to be identified with what-
ever the architectural work (of art) is; and perhaps 
the two questions are independent.
Consider, for instance, Dominic Lopes’s claim 
that while according to standard western ontology a 
building is a material object individuated as common 
sense individuates objects like chairs and tables, 
according to traditional Japanese ontology, build-
ings are token events, which may also include one 
or more round of reconstruction.7 It is easy to see 
how important consequences for the persistence 
question follow from Lopes’s specific answer to the 
ontological question. If an adherent of the standard 
western ontology visits the goshoden (i.e. the main 
sanctified structure) of Ise Jingū – one of Japan’s 
most visited Shinto shrines – today, she is neces-
sarily visiting a building that is no more than twenty 
years old. In fact the goshoden has been rebuilt about 
every twenty years in the latest twelve centuries, 
alternatively in one of two adjacent lots, introducing 
numerous changes in material and spatial specifi-
cations from one rebuilding to the next. From the 
point of view of standard western ontology, about 
one hundred different buildings have been built up 
and destroyed in that couple of adjacent lots since 
Ise Jingū was founded in around the sixth century. 
Quite differently, when an adherent of the traditional 
Japanese ontology visits the goshoden today, what 
she visits is the very same building that was built in 
the sixth century. In other words, if we take buildings 
to be token events, then the goshoden of Ise Jingū 
today is the same building as the goshoden of Ise 
Jingū in the sixth or the tenth century, since each is 
part of the same individual event – just like the first 
part of your birthday party yesterday at 8.00 pm, and 
the final part of your birthday party today at 4.00 am, 
are both with full rights temporal parts of the same 
party, so that Jenny can truly assert she attended 
the same party Jack did, provided that Jack showed 
up at the party yesterday at 8.00 pm and left at 9.00 
pm while Jenny only popped in today at 4.00 am.
Indeed, a range of recent works by social and 
cultural geographers seems to conceptualise build-
ings less as material objects than as events, that 
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(3) Differently from ordinary objects and works of art 
such as paintings, sculptures, songs, symphonies, 
tragedies, movies and novels, (the majority of) build-
ings are such that changing their position alters one of 
their essential properties.
One possible explanation of (3) is that buildings, 
differently from ordinary objects and works of art, 
are originally conceived by their planners as perma-
nently located in a certain position. An advantage of 
this answer is that it correctly predicts that we would 
more easily accept statements like (2) with respect 
to buildings that were not originally conceived by 
their planners as permanently located in a certain 
position – like for example modular buildings. 
Still it should be noted that we would probably 
continue rejecting (2) even if an ancient, undisput-
edly authentic manuscript were discovered where 
Bishop Maurice de Sully reported that his first 
vision of Notre Dame was compatible with it being 
transferred in the future to ‘a far land beyond the 
sea’ – and I imagine nothing would change if anal-
ogous discoveries proved that the same authorial 
intent were attributable to any architect-like figure 
who contributed to the edification of the cathedral, 
such as to Jean de Chelles and Pierre de Montreuil.
We may also note that works of art are not consti-
tutively located in a certain position even in cases 
where their authors originally conceived them so. 
Indeed, they are not generally constitutively located 
in a certain position tout court. But a few considera-
tions are in order here.
First, Sherri Irvin has recently argued that the 
artist’s sanction is decisive in fixing the boundaries 
of a work of art and to determine whether a certain 
feature of the work of art (even a future one) is to 
be considered as constitutive or accidental.13 A 
corollary of her claim seems to be that, when an 
artist sanctions that a work of art cannot (or can) 
be moved, this results in the work’s being (or being 
not) constitutively located in a certain position. But 
In the remaining sections of the article I will 
assume buildings to be (i) architectural works (of art), 
(ii) material objects, and (iii) material instances of a 
type expressed by an architectural plan, in accord-
ance with the commonly accepted view. However, 
I think that these issues should be considered as 
open; and I take each of them as an illustration of 
the interdependence of the persistence and onto-
logical questions.
Relocation
An interesting problem worth investigating is how 
the persistence question about buildings is affected 
by their spatial relocation. It is thought-provoking if 
for no other reason than because we cannot find 
any corresponding problem affecting the persis-
tence question about ordinary objects or works of 
art. We unproblematically consider statements of 
this kind as true:
(1) the painting called ‘Impression, soleil levant 
by Monet’ which was in Paris last year is the same 
painting as the painting called ‘Impression, soleil 
levant by Monet’ which is in Las Vegas now (provided 
that the painting has been carefully moved from Paris 
to Las Vegas).
On the contrary, we may doubt whether a specific 
building would still be the same if we moved it to 
another location; and we would consider at least 
some statements of this kind as false: [Fig. 1]
 (2) the building called ‘Notre Dame’ that was in Paris 
last year is the same building as the building called 
‘Notre Dame’ that is in Las Vegas now (after meticu-
lous stone-by-stone transfer).12
It seems that to change the position of Notre Dame 
is to alter one of its essential properties, while no 
essential property of an ordinary object or work 
of art is ever altered by moving it. But why? We 
are in search of an explanation for the following 
proposition:
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Fig. 1: Notre Dame Cathedral, Île de la Cité, Paris, France. Photographer: David Monniaux.
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are constitutively located in a certain position. It is 
the case of all site-specific art, such as for example 
street art. Site-specific art is an artistic genre 
born in the 1960s and 1970s ‘which incorporated 
the physical conditions of a particular location as 
integral to the production, presentation, and recep-
tion of art’ and ‘gave itself up to its environmental 
context,16 being formally determined or directed by 
it’.17 Street art is a subgenre of site-specific art that 
makes ‘material use of the street that is internal to 
its meaning’,18 so that pulling it from the street would 
‘destroy […] its meaning and status as street art’.19 I 
will come back to site-specific art and street art later 
in the essay. However it remains true that ordinary 
works of art do not normally turn out to be consti-
tutively located in a certain position tout court, as 
previously noted.
To return to our main argument, we would still 
need an explanation of (3). One may say that what 
makes the difference is that buildings are particu-
larly difficult to move, so that they are ordinarily 
never moved. Somehow, such immobility makes 
their being located in the particular position they 
occupy a constitutive property. A first difficulty is 
that we are not explaining why an accidental prop-
erty – ‘being durably located in a certain position 
P’ – turns out to be a constitutive property. A second, 
related difficulty is that ‘being difficult to move’ and 
‘being durably located in a certain position P’ are 
also properties of some ordinary objects. Consider 
the Ahnighito meteorite, which weighs 31 tons and 
can surely be classified as no less difficult to move 
than the average building – if for no other reason 
than because it cannot be dismantled and rebuilt. 
Its long-lasting immobility has once been violated 
when it was laboriously moved from Cape York, 
Greenland to the American Museum of Natural 
History in New York; and still its persistence has not 
been affected at all by this relocation. Then clearly 
it is not true that accidental immobility or difficulty to 
move per se can explain (3).
isn’t Irvin attributing too much power to the artist’s 
sanction? Suppose for example that Vincent van 
Gogh had publicly declared in 1890 at relevant 
points during the production of Wheatfield Under 
Thunderclouds that it was to be conceived as an 
unconventional work of art among whose essential 
features had to be included new physical features 
at different moments in the future – that is, all the 
new physical features caused by a series of hard 
hammer blows to be delivered by the curators to 
the work in 1990, 2090, 2190 and so on. I am not 
convinced that we would agree with Irvin that the 
curators should obey Van Gogh, and above all that 
such an artist’s sanction would have had an impact 
on what are the constitutive properties of the work. 
Irvin acknowledges that the artist’s sanction func-
tions in concert with a set of conventions, but the 
point here is precisely that these well-established 
common stances, when they exist – together 
with how the public de facto (most of the times 
conservatively) solves problems of metaphysical 
indeterminacy about works of art, such as those 
consisting in determining whether a specific prop-
erty is constitutive or contingent – appear often 
normatively more relevant than the artist’s sanction 
itself. To come to an actual case, the Czech-born 
writer Milan Kundera seems to have repeatedly 
sanctioned as a constitutive property of his literary 
works of art that they are published as a traditional 
book printed on paper rather than in digital form.14 
I doubt, however, also in this circumstance whether 
the artist’s sanction has proved sufficient to make 
that property constitutive. This is why I am assuming 
that historical discoveries about Maurice de Sully, 
Jean de Chelles and Pierre de Montreuil’s originally 
conceiving Notre Dame as movable would not be 
sufficient for us to stop rejecting (2).15 And of course 
we would still be in need of an explanation of (3).
A second consideration: some special works of 
art exist that, differently from paintings, sculptures, 
songs, symphonies, tragedies, movies and novels, 
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Which is a correct specification of (3)? Consider 
again Notre Dame and its capacity to survive 
different kinds of change. Both (4) and (5) predict 
that we would reject (2) in case of a meticulous 
stone-by-stone transfer of Notre Dame from Paris to 
Las Vegas. Their predictions, however, would signif-
icantly differ with respect to more complex imaginary 
scenarios. Suppose that we transfer the entire city 
of Paris – Notre Dame included – to Clark County, 
Nevada. Like in the previous scenario, Notre Dame 
has been transferred to Las Vegas. But now – in 
spite of its occupying a lot which is very far away 
from its original location – it is still surrounded by the 
things that we used to call ‘Quai de Montebello’, ‘the 
Préfecture de Police’, ‘the Pont de l’Archevêché’, 
and so on, which have been scrupulously relocated 
as well. ‘The Seine’, too is flowing as usual along 
one side of the cathedral and between ‘Île Saint-
Louis’ and ‘Île de la Cité’ (although its waters are 
now running from a source located somewhere in 
the US rather than in Burgundy). Would we judge 
that Notre Dame has survived the relocation? It 
seems to me that we would be inclined to accept (2) 
under these circumstances (in spite of the changes 
in climate, the quality of the sunlight, and so on). 
After all, Notre Dame would be surrounded by the 
same Parisian things it is usually surrounded by in 
Paris, as always, and this seems quite important for 
accepting (2).
Of course there should be an analogous hesitation 
in considering the relocated ‘Préfecture de Police’ 
as the same architectural entity as the Préfecture 
de Police, the relocated ‘Pont de l’Archevêché’ 
as the same architectural entity as the Pont de 
l’Archevêché, and so on. This in turn may cast 
doubt on whether to accept the previous scenario 
as one in which the outer context of Notre Dame has 
remained the same (and, only its absolute position 
on the earth’s surface has changed, along with the 
ensuing astronomic and climatic consequences). 
Two answers are in order. The first answer is the 
holistic claim that the relocated Notre Dame would 
Another dead end is pointing at the fact that 
buildings – differently from ordinary objects and the 
aforementioned works of art – do have foundations 
that make them firmly implanted and deeply rooted 
in the ground, hence constitutively bound up with 
their location. In fact, on the one hand there are 
some buildings with respect to which statements of 
type (2) hold, and which at the same time do not 
have any foundations (such as the Doric Temple 
in the Triangular Forum in Pompeii) or are visually 
perceived as if their foundations are not a proper 
part of them (such as Shigeru Ban’s Paper House in 
Yamanakako, which stands on an elevated, square 
platform). On the other hand, trees can survive 
relocation in spite of their being rooted deeply in 
the ground – so that even the General Sherman 
tree – the world’s largest giant sequoia located in 
Sequoia National Park, California – is commonly 
conceived as a material object that would persist 
even if (carefully) moved to another park.
More complex imaginary scenarios
We can take a step forward by trying to further 
specify (3). When we say that ‘(the majority of) 
buildings are such that changing their position 
would alter one of their essential properties’, we are 
not specific enough about what exactly the essen-
tial property is that is altered by a position change. 
One possibility is this:
(4) Unlike ordinary objects and works of art, (the 
majority of) buildings are such that changing their 
position would alter one of their essential properties, 
that is, the property of being located in the particular 
part of the earth’s surface they occupy.
Another, quite different possibility is this:
(5) Unlike ordinary objects and works of art, (the 
majority of) buildings are such that changing their posi-
tion would alter one of their essential properties, that 
is, the property of being surrounded by their specific 
external context.
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Now consider the opposite situation, in which we 
change the building’s outer context by preserving 
its original position on a specific part of the earth’s 
surface. Suppose that we leave Notre Dame where 
it has always been, but we substitute the whole 
town of Paris around the cathedral for the town of 
Las Vegas (with the exception of the Plaza Hotel 
and Casino), say, which we eliminate in order to 
create an empty space in which to nestle Notre 
Dame, at the very beginning of the Freemont Street 
Experience. [Fig. 2]
The Hôtel-Dieu, the Préfecture de Police, the 
Conciergerie and the Pont Saint-Michel are not 
around the building anymore. Along its spiral 
387-step-climb it is obviously still possible to have 
a closer look at its famous gargoyles and chimeras, 
but there is no breath-taking panorama of Paris; 
rather you can enjoy a spectacular view of down-
town Las Vegas with its glowing neon signs. I 
assume that in this case we might decide to reject 
(2). 
Our mental experiments reveal that (5) rather 
than (4) is an adequate specification of (3) – what 
may in turn prove valuable for explaining it. The 
main question now is: why is the property of being 
surrounded by their specific outer context an essen-
tial property of buildings, but not of ordinary objects 
and works of art?
The answer
Consider a musical work of art like Beethoven’s 
Fifth Symphony. Although it was premiered on 
22 December 1808 at the Theater an der Wien in 
Vienna conducted by Beethoven himself, we usually 
do not consider it essential for a musical perfor-
mance to count as an execution of Beethoven’s Fifth 
Symphony that it be performed on 22 December 
1808 or be conducted by Beethoven (that would 
imply that it is no longer possible to perform it). Why? 
Because we have a decisive and clear criterion for 
be the same as the Notre Dame in Paris by virtue 
of the relocated Quai de Montebello, Préfecture de 
Police and Pont de l’Archevêché being the same as 
the Quai de Montebello, Préfecture de Police and 
Pont de l’Archevêché in Paris, and vice versa – the 
relocated Quai de Montebello would be the same as 
the Quai de Montebello in Paris by virtue of the relo-
cated Notre Dame, Préfecture de Police and Pont 
de l’Archevêché being the same as the Notre Dame, 
Préfecture de Police and Pont de l’Archevêché in 
Paris. To say it in French, tout se tient with respect to 
buildings’ persistence after relocation. The second 
answer is that the requirements for an outer context 
at t1 to be the same as another outer context at t2 
are weaker than the requirements for a building at t1 
to be the same as another building at t2. Specifically, 
for context X at t1 to be the same as context Y at t2 it 
is not necessary that every building that is part of X 
at t1 be the same as one (and only one) building that 
is part of Y at t2. In particular, either physical iden-
tity or physical continuity seems perfectly sufficient 
to guarantee context identity over time, although 
neither seems sufficient to guarantee building iden-
tity over time. Since the scenario we have imagined 
is a scenario in which physical identity is preserved, 
it can be considered a scenario in which the outer 
context is the same in spite of the fact that we may 
hesitate to consider each component architectural 
entity – such as the relocated Préfecture de Police 
and Pont de l’Archevêché – as being the same as 
the Préfecture de Police and Pont de l’Archevêché 
that were in Paris. Incidentally, the latter answer 
also explains why we may accept (2) by virtue of 
the outer context being the same as in Paris, while 
at the same time being uncertain as to whether the 
relocated town is identical with Paris. We may add 
that the problem whether the relocated town is the 
same as Paris may depend in turn on whether the 
relocated town is surrounded by the same specific 
outer context Paris was originally surrounded by 
(and so on).
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Fig. 2: The Fremont Street Experience by The Jerde Partnership (1995), Las Vegas, Nevada, USA. Photographer: 
Jean-Christophe Benoist
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the constitutive properties – those features, and 
only those features, that are eligible to be aestheti-
cally relevant in the aesthetic judgements about the 
works of art of that kind are also not dismissible as 
contingent with regards to the individual works of 
art of that kind. In other words, when a notational 
language exists, it identifies constitutive properties; 
when a notational language either does not exist or 
is incapable of specifying all the constitutive proper-
ties, the source of differentiation among constitutive 
and non-constitutive properties lies in a property’s 
being eligible or not eligible to be aesthetically rele-
vant in the aesthetic judgements about those works. 
Since such eligibility depends in turn on historical, 
social, cultural and ideological factors, the very 
distinction among constitutive and non-constitutive 
properties for each family of works characterised by 
missing or ‘weak’ notation is finally contingent on 
such factors. This amounts to saying that, whenever 
it has not been culturally solved by precipitating a 
notational language which in turn provides ‘a theo-
retically decisive test for compliance’, the problem 
of determining what the constitutive properties of a 
specific kind of work of art are is still fluid and at the 
mercy of socio-culturally accepted aesthetic judge-
mental practises.
This story can be useful to shed light on the 
peculiar case of buildings, at least if – as I am 
assuming – buildings are or can be equated with 
works of art after all. First, we do have in architecture 
a kind of notational language in plans; but it is mani-
fest that we usually allow among the constitutive 
properties of edifices much more intrinsic proper-
ties than just those indicated in plans (for example, 
materials, interaction with sunlight, shadows).22 
Thus, as in painting, in architecture no intrinsic 
feature can usually be dismissed as contingent.
Secondly, differently than for paintings, sympho-
nies and novels, our aesthetic judgements about 
buildings often concern, and are grounded on, 
extrinsic properties too: relational properties of 
distinguishing contingent from constitutive proper-
ties in the case of classical music. The criterion – as 
Goodman pointed out – is that the constitutive prop-
erties are only those prescribed by the score; and 
the score is in a definite notation. Therefore any 
performance that complies with the score is a perfor-
mance of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, regardless 
of the circumstances under which it is played.20 
The same – mutatis mutandis – holds for works 
of art like songs, comedies, tragedies and novels. 
For paintings and sculptures things are different: 
there is no notation. This means that we lack any 
criterion for telling contingent from constitutive 
properties. As Goodman explains, ‘in painting, with 
no such alphabet of characters, none of the picto-
rial properties – none of the properties the picture 
has as such – is distinguished as constitutive; 
no such feature can be dismissed as contingent, 
and no deviation is insignificant’.21 Still – it must 
be observed – we generally do not consider that 
contextual properties are among the constitutive 
properties of paintings. For example, we do not think 
that paintings cease to be the particular works of art 
they are if they are moved away from the painter’s 
atelier or from the location where the painter has 
chosen to exhibit them. The reason seems to be 
that our aesthetic judgements about paintings only 
concern, and are grounded on, intrinsic properties of 
the painting. No property of any entity forming part 
of the outer context – and no relational properties of 
the painting among whose relata are entities forming 
part of its outer context (like ‘being illuminated in a 
particular way by L’) – can ever found an aesthetic 
judgement about a painting. Without a doubt, things 
might have been different: it might have been the 
case that our most serious aesthetic evaluation of 
paintings could also take the form of judgements 
like: ‘Guernica has such a dramatic quality thanks to 
the giant white-haired museum attendant standing 
guard at the door next to it’. But usually, nothing 
of the like happens. And – when we deal with a 
kind of work of art for which a notational language 
is absent or in any case insufficient to specify all 
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be dismissed as contingent nor distinguished as 
constitutive. Thus, while altering the majority or the 
totality of contextual properties certainly prevents 
the persistence of the building, altering just one 
or a handful of them can hardly be considered 
to do so). And indeed, if asked to compare Notre 
Dame’s meticulous stone-by-stone transfer to Las 
Vegas with Notre Dame’s meticulous stone-by-
stone transfer to the Île Saint-Louis (where many 
‘Parisian properties’ are preserved, such as for 
example ‘being near the Pont de l’Archevêché’), we 
would very probably value the latter relocation as 
less menacing to Notre Dame’s persistence than 
the former.
We would also expect very minute context 
changes to be negligible as to the persistence of 
a building. Indeed some minor alteration of the 
outer context, like the appearance of M. Dupont 
walking down the Rue de la Cité does not alter 
Notre Dame’s identity and is entirely innocuous as 
to its persistence. We are tempted to say that there 
is something like a maximum partial change in the 
outer context that a building can survive, and that it 
is perhaps possible to determine it.
But a difficulty arises here. Whatever the 
maximum context change that is not detrimental 
to Notre Dame’s persistence – and indepen-
dently of whether we can ever determine it – it is 
indisputable that there is an even greater context 
change that is nevertheless revealed not to be 
lethal to Notre Dame’s persistence, namely the 
change from thirteenth-century Paris to contempo-
rary Paris. Indeed Paris has changed dramatically 
around Notre Dame since its construction, to the 
point that we can agree that contemporary Paris is 
more similar to – say – contemporary Lyon than to 
thirteenth-century Paris. Yet we would value Notre 
Dame’s stone-by-stone transfer to contemporary 
Lyon as more threatening to its persistence than 
its outer context change from thirteenth-century 
Paris to contemporary Paris, which indeed proved 
the building among whose relata are entities that 
form part of its outer context, and even non-rela-
tional properties directly instantiated by entities 
belonging to that context. To give some exam-
ples, it is not uncommon for aesthetic judgements 
about Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater to rely on 
its integration with the striking natural surroundings 
and even on the beauty of the waterfall itself; for 
aesthetic judgements about Palazzo Sansedoni 
in Siena to mention some properties of the other 
buildings lining the shell-shaped Piazza del Campo; 
for aesthetic judgements about Alila Villas Uluwatu 
by WOHA Architects to stress the importance of 
the sea view and the shadows cast inside by the 
sunlight; [Fig. 3] and for aesthetic judgements 
about Under Pohutukawa Residence by Herbst 
Architects to depend on properties relating to the 
amazing mature Pohutukawa trees around the 
house. [Fig. 4] Indeed there is no extrinsic contex-
tual feature of an architectural entity that cannot be 
crucially used in an aesthetic judgement about it. 
Therefore, regarding architectural works in general, 
the set of features that cannot be dismissed as 
contingent includes all contextual features. This 
explains why usually buildings cannot survive relo-
cation: because usually there is no basis for ruling 
out any extrinsic contextual feature of the work as 
inessential. The same is clearly not true of ordinary 
objects and works of art, whose essential features 
are generally considered to be a subset of their 
intrinsic features, no matter what view we take of 
their specific nature.23 This gives us an explanation 
of (5).
A further difficulty
There is another curious aspect of the problem that 
deserves analysis. We would usually expect that 
the higher the number of the contextual properties 
of a building that are altered by a particular reloca-
tion, the more threatening that relocation would be 
to the persistence of the building. (Remember that 
contextual properties are not just constitutive prop-
erties, and rather are properties that can neither 
96
Fig. 3: Alila Villas Uluwatu by WOHA Architects (2009), Bali, Indonesia. Photographer: Patrick Bingham-Hall
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Fig. 4: Under Pohutukawa Residence by Herbst Architects (2011), Piha North, New Zealand. Photographer: Patrick 
Reynolds. Contractor: John Armstrong
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years – would reasonably prove innocuous too. On 
the contrary, the quick and immediate relocation of 
Notre Dame to Las Vegas, however meticulous, 
is not gradual; and any gradual transfer of Notre 
Dame from Paris to Las Vegas seems to affect 
Notre Dame’s persistence for independent reasons 
(namely the cathedral would cease to exist – or 
it would be in no place, or it would be in two very 
different places – for too long a time).
A weakness affecting this position is that it is not 
clear why a building can survive a significant altera-
tion to its contextual properties when the alteration 
is slow and gradual. After all, altering a constitutive 
property of an entity slowly and gradually is none-
theless an alteration. Perhaps it is simply true that, 
for all properties of an architectural entity that can be 
neither dismissed as contingent nor distinguished 
as constitutive, there are some alterations that are 
so slow and gradual that the entity can survive 
them. Or, perhaps contextual properties can (only) 
be temporarily (although necessarily for a very long 
time) constitutive of an architectural entity.
Another interesting answer is this: the change 
from thirteenth-century Paris to contemporary 
Paris around Notre Dame proved to be inoffensive 
as to Notre Dame’s persistence because it is not 
a context change, although it certainly is a change 
of many (if not all) of its contextual properties. The 
idea is that contexts – just like persons, cities and 
Theseus’s ships – can persist in spite of ongoing 
changes to their properties. We may try to specify 
the relation that would constitute a sufficient condi-
tion for the persistence of contexts by analogy with 
the psychological relation that is thought to be the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the persis-
tence of people. For example:
X at t1 is the same context as Y at t2 if X is persisten-
tially continuous with Y, where persistential continuity 
is defined as the relation realised by overlapping 
chains of strong persistential connectedness; in turn, 
inoffensive. In any case, it seems that the context 
change from thirteenth-century Paris to contempo-
rary Paris is both greater and less threatening that 
any conjectural maximum context change that is not 
detrimental to Notre Dame’s persistence – such as, 
for example, Notre Dame’s 180-degree rotation so 
that it faces east instead of west, or its transfer to 
the Square de la Tour Saint-Jacques in the fourth 
arrondissement in Paris.
One possible answer is that the slower a context 
change, the less menacing its magnitude. According 
to this hypothesis, replacing the whole city of Paris 
around Notre Dame with the city of Las Vegas would 
not affect Notre Dame’s persistence, provided that 
the replacement is gradual enough (imagine substi-
tuting no more than one Parisian brick around Notre 
Dame with one Las Vegas brick per day). Therefore, 
while we cannot accept that:
(6) the building called ‘Notre Dame’ that was 
surrounded by Paris last year is the same building as 
the building called ‘Notre Dame’ that is surrounded by 
a scrupulously relocated Las Vegas now,
we may accept that:
(7) the building called ‘Notre Dame’ that was 
surrounded by Paris 800 years ago is the same 
building as the building called ‘Notre Dame’ that is 
surrounded by a scrupulously relocated Las Vegas 
now,
provided that the replacement of Paris with Las 
Vegas occurs gradually along all the 800-year period. 
Once again, it must be noted that contemporary 
Paris can be judged as more similar to contempo-
rary Las Vegas than to the thirteenth-century Paris; 
and if the context change from thirteenth-century 
Paris to contemporary Paris proved inoffensive as 
to Notre Dame’s persistence, the context change 
from contemporary Paris to Las Vegas as it is 
now – if it occurred gradually over the course of 800 
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to Notre Dame’s persistence because it is not a 
context change, a clarification is needed as to how 
Notre Dame’s contextual features are identified. We 
have claimed that the set of Notre Dame’s features 
that cannot be dismissed as contingent includes all 
its contextual features. What we need is for Notre 
Dame’s contextual features to be identified so as 
not to change as far as the context persists. For 
example, they must rather include ‘being illumi-
nated in whatever particular way it happens to be 
illuminated in context X’ than ‘being illuminated in 
particular way W’.
A third, perhaps more obvious answer is to 
concede that the change from thirteenth-century 
Paris to contemporary Paris was a change of the 
context around Notre Dame, and to remark that 
nonetheless it was not a city change. It is possible 
for architectural entities to persist over a very large 
context change, provided that this change is not also 
a city change. Again, we need to identify contex-
tual properties so as not to vary as far as the city 
persists (for example: ‘being illuminated by the light 
of Paris’). And – above all – we need to account 
for the persistence of cities without relying on the 
persistence of the architectural entities that are 
part of them. One of the problems of this answer, 
however, is that while every architectural entity is 
surrounded by a context, not every architectural 
entity is surrounded by a city. Working on contexts 
rather than cities has the advantage that our 
conclusions will account not only for Notre Dame, 
but also for Under Pohutukawa Residence, among 
whose constitutive properties seem to be properties 
relating to the wonderful mature Pohutukawa trees 
currently standing in its remarkable context.
Conclusions
I have focused on the problem of how the persis-
tence question about buildings is affected by their 
spatial relocation, and why in particular (the majority 
of) buildings are such that to change their position 
is to alter one of their essential properties – while 
persistential connectedness is the holding of particular 
connections realised by unproblematic instantiations 
of the relationship of identity over time of architec-
tural entities and other macroentities like trees and 
rivers (such as the relationships among a war memo-
rial yesterday and the same war memorial persisting 
today, or among a coffee house on Monday and the 
same coffee house persisting on Tuesday), and strong 
persistential connectedness is the holding of very 
many such connections.24
However intriguing, this path appears doomed to 
circularity. In fact – one may say – we would be 
explaining Notre Dame’s persistence by appealing 
to the persistence of its context, while explaining 
the persistence of the context by appealing to the 
persistence of many architectural entities like Notre 
Dame. We can escape circularity by offering a 
very different account of context persistence, since 
either physical identity, or physical continuity, or in 
certain cases even perceptual indistinguibility or 
perceptual similarity seem perfectly sufficient to 
guarantee context identity over time.25 Or we may 
argue that there is no circularity here, since we are 
just saying that persistence questions about certain 
architectural entities located in the same region of 
space are intertwined among each other as well as 
with those about other non-architectural macroenti-
ties like trees and hills, and when we are uncertain 
about the persistence of architectural entity P over 
time period T, we should look at the rate of persis-
tence of the other things around P over T of which 
we are reasonably certain. Looking at the overlap-
ping chains of strong persistential connectedness 
is nothing but a specific elaborate way of doing it. 
Talking about contexts, and identity of contexts over 
time, is only introducing shorter and more conven-
ient language to do the same, in a similarly specific 
elaborate way.
Of course, if we want to hold that the change 
from thirteenth-century Paris to contemporary Paris 
around Notre Dame proved to be inoffensive as 
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One may argue that, in particular, inasmuch as 
urban buildings are to be considered as art, they 
are to be considered as street art. Consider the defi-
nition of street art offered by Nicholas A. Riggle: a 
work of art is street art if, and only if, (i) it uses the 
street as an artistic resource, and (ii) the artistic use 
of the street is internal to its significance, that is, it 
contributes essentially to its meaning.26 It is difficult 
to see how any urban building which we accept to 
qualify as art can fail to satisfy (i) and (ii). (It must be 
remarked, however, that condition (ii) requires outer 
contextual properties to be necessarily essential 
rather than barely not dismissable as inessential.) In 
fact Riggle assumes his definition to imply that the 
work’s meaning is severely compromised when it is 
removed from the street.27 This is no different from 
saying that some street-related extrinsic contextual 
properties are constitutive to the work of street art 
(apparently because they are constitutive to their 
meaning, which in turn is constitutive to its iden-
tity). Similarly, as said, we cannot remove an urban 
building from the street without threatening its iden-
tity, precisely because no street-related extrinsic 
contextual properties can be dismissed as non-
constitutive. Although there is no logical necessity, I 
take this to be convincing evidence for considering 
urban buildings as street art (provided that we want 
to consider them as art in the first place). Note that, 
if it is correct to qualify urban buildings as street art, 
then Riggle is wrong in claiming that street art is 
very likely to be ‘illegal, anonymous, ephemeral, 
highly creative, and attractive’ as well as ‘cheap to 
make, free to experience,28 and owned and over-
seen by no one’, since urban buildings – which 
easily turn out to constitute the largest part of street 
art in a city – will barely possess these features.29
It is interesting to note that site-specific works 
of art realised in the 1960s and 1970s have been 
somehow ‘mobilised’ by pressures of the museum 
culture and art market of the late 1980s. Many 
site-specific works of art have been relocated for 
important exhibitions (and, in some cases, new 
nothing similar happens to ordinary objects and 
traditional works of art .
I have argued that the solution to the mystery 
relies on how the distinction among constitutive and 
non-constitutive properties is drawn in the case of 
architecture. In the absence of a strong notational 
language, this distinction is unstable and contingent 
upon what properties are admissible to relevantly 
appear in aesthetic judgements about architec-
tural entities such as buildings at a given time and 
place. Since currently in Western culture, aesthetic 
judgements about architectural entities can de 
facto relevantly mention extrinsic contextual prop-
erties, no extrinsic contextual property can ever be 
dismissed as inessential to any architectural entity 
possessing it.
Once we have an explanation of why buildings 
can usually not survive relocation, we are in a better 
position to explore the relation among architec-
ture and site-specific art. It seems to me that if we 
consider architecture to be art, we should classify it 
as a particular kind of site-specific art. Again, even 
if we do not think of architecture as art, whenever 
we equate architectural entities with works of art, 
we should equate them with site-specific works of 
art. In fact site-specific works of art as such appear 
to be incapable of surviving relocation for the same 
reasons that architectural entities are incapable of 
surviving relocation; like for architectural entities, 
the essential property of the site-specific works 
of art affected by their relocation is that of being 
surrounded by their specific outer context rather 
than that of being located in the particular part of 
earth’s surface they occupy; and the paradox of the 
harmlessness of the change of surrounding context 
also afflicts site-specific art. It could even be argued 
that the many points in common among architec-
tural entities and site-specific works of art are a 
sufficient reason for considering architecture to be 
(site-specific) art after all.
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the culture industry and the political economy in 
the future started to make the relocation of build-
ings happen, we would in turn change our ways 
of aesthetically judging buildings in the first place. 
This would produce a transformation in the meta-
physical status of the extrinsic contextual features 
of buildings, which would lose their qualification of 
‘not dismissable as inessential’. We might take our 
current intuition that these would be the effects of 
introducing the practise of relocating buildings as 
further evidence for the thesis according to which 
architecture is one kind of site-specific art. What 
would happen to architecture if transferability 
becomes reality is apparently no different from what 
has happened to once site-specific (non-architec-
tural) art under the same circumstances.
I assume that it is possible to offer alternative 
readings of the recent mobilisation of site-oriented 
works of art. For instance, we may want to say 
that the outer contextual properties have never 
ceased to be not dismissable as inessential, and in 
consequence there is one numerically different site-
specific work of art at each location at which the 
artist re-represents her original project. But again, 
it seems that one who holds this view will have 
no reason for discarding the very same view with 
regard to the mobilisation of buildings. It is important 
that – whatever one thinks of the consequences of 
relocation for site-responsive art – the effects on 
architecture are taken to be the same.
To understand why architectural entities are not 
currently thought to survive spatial relocation is not 
a trivial issue. I have tried not only to offer an expla-
nation of this fact, but also to show how casting light 
on this question has interesting consequences for 
our knowledge of the ontology and aesthetics of 
architecture in general.
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